Banking market structure, creation and activity of firms : Early evidence for co-operatives in the Italian case by Gagliardi, F.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BANKING MARKET STRUCTURE, CREATION AND ACTIVITY OF FIRMS: 
EARLY EVIDENCE FOR COOPERATIVES IN THE ITALIAN CASE 
 
 
by 
 
Francesca GAGLIARDI∗ § 
 
The Business School, University of Hertfordshire, UK 
 
 
 
Published in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2009, 80 (4), pp.575-610 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper investigates whether local differences in banking competition impact on the creation and 
activity of firms, with a special focus on cooperatives. The empirical analysis, implemented on a sample of Italian 
firms, reveals non-monotonic effects of bank market power on firm creation and activity. In regard to the former, a 
bell-shaped relationship is found for both cooperative and non-cooperative firms, suggesting that a moderately 
concentrated banking market favors firms’ creation. A less homogeneous pattern characterizes firms’ activity: a 
bell-shaped parabola is still found for non-cooperative firms, while a U-shaped relationship emerges for coopera-
tives, showing that active coops benefit from a relatively more intense banking competition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗ The Business School, University of Hertfordshire, Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, De 
Havilland campus, Hatfield, Hertfordshire, AL10 9AB, UK. Tel.: +44 (0)1707 285570; Fax: +44 (0)1707 285455. 
Email: f.gagliardi@herts.ac.uk. 
§ I am grateful to Mariarosaria Agostino, Hulya Dagdeviren, Avinash K. Dixit, Giovanni Dosi, Elena Granaglia, 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Rosanna Nisticò, Douglass C. North, Francesco Trivieri, Ya Ping Yin, and two anonymous 
referees for their valuable comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. All remaining shortcom-
ings are mine. 
2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The cooperative firm has been analyzed in the economic literature, on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds, with respect to a number of different but related issues. Among these, the role of external 
sources of financing, and especially bank credit, has been regarded a critical factor influencing the crea-
tion, functioning and survival of cooperatives (Ben-Ner, 1988a and b). It has been argued that their 
property rights structure creates a number of issues in the relationship with external financers, due to the 
problem of guarantees offered to third parties financing the firm (Jossa and Cuomo, 1997). Indeed, 
workers’ typically limited wealth, and consequent risk aversion and liquidity constraints, bound the per-
sonal collateral available for obtaining loans (Ben-Ner, 1988a). Moreover, the so-called cooperatives’ 
vaguely defined property rights (Cook, 1995) create a commitment problem of members (Schlicht and 
von Weizäcker, 1977), which makes agency problems in credit markets more severe for these firms than 
for other enterprises (Vitaliano, 1983; Drèze, 1993; Dow, 2003). Therefore, although the banking sys-
tem represents also for other firms an important channel of resources acquisition, it seems reasonable to 
argue that the structure of the financial sector can have particularly relevant implications for cooperatives. 
This work empirically investigates whether, ceteris paribus, the structure of the banking market – an 
important feature of the institutional environment embedding entrepreneurship – influences differently 
the financing of cooperatives, as compared to the effects produced for other business types, with regard 
to both firm creation and entrepreneurial activity. This is not a trivial issue since the economic literature 
analyzing the effects of bank market power has not provided yet a univocal answer to the question of 
how competition among banks affects the availability of credit to firms, hence indirectly their formation 
and functioning. In fact, the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) scheme claims that, as in every other 
economic sector, lower competition in the banking industry leads to welfare losses (Pagano, 1993; 
Guzman, 2000). Yet, the studies belonging to the information-based-approach show that, in general 
terms, the implications of banking market structure can be different from those predicted by the tradi-
tional SCP framework, and that the effects on firms’ financing, hence on entrepreneurship, are also re-
lated to the possibility of setting in and maintaining lending relationships (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 
1995). In light of the above considerations, analyzing the impact of bank market power on firms’ financ-
ing, hence on entrepreneurship, by distinguishing among different business structures, assumes relev-
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ance since cooperative firms’ institutional characteristics may impact on the establishment and/or main-
tenance of lending relationships. 
By discerning among cooperatives and other firms, and between creation and activity, this work 
enriches the existing literature in several respects. Firstly, it contributes to explore the link between the 
behavior of banking institutions and cooperative firms’ performance, which is a highly disputed issue. 
Indeed, although the difficulties that cooperators might face in obtaining and providing financial capital 
have been used as an argument against the viability of these firms (Blair et al, 2000), research on coop-
eratives suggests that their success is highly dependent on the type of financial and cultural regime pre-
vailing in the local and national economy (Hovart, 1975; Thomas and Defourny, 1990; Gagliardi, 2009). 
Secondly, although other contributions studied the effects of bank competition on entrepreneurship (e.g. 
Black and Strahan, 2002; Bonaccorsi Di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004), they have not accounted for the 
possibility that the impact of differences in credit market structure on firms’ financing  may vary among 
different business types. 
The present paper, and this is its third distinctive feature, aims to evaluate the results of the econome-
tric investigation by means of the institutional complementarity approach, a novel interpretative frame-
work recently proposed in the institutionalist literature. In perhaps the most extensive treatment so far 
existing on this issue, Aoki (2001) claims that the relationships among the characteristics of various 
market governance mechanisms prevailing in one economy, at any particular point in time, may be 
complementary in the sense that the effectiveness (or the presence) of one governance mechanism can 
be reinforced - either directly or indirectly - by the presence of a particular arrangement in the same or 
embedding domain. So that, in terms of the concept à la Aoki (2001), this work intends to assess wheth-
er the institutional counterpart complementary to the creation and activity of different business struc-
tures is a local banking market characterized by a higher or lower degree of competition. 
To carry out the investigation the research uses data on firms operating in 27 industries in the 103 
Italian provinces during the period 1998-2003. The administrative province is the relevant local market 
in the Italian case and, since the structure of the banking industry differs substantially across local mar-
kets, this provides sufficient cross-sectional variability within a single institutional framework. So that, 
given this regulatory uniformity, there is no need to control for different regimes (Bonaccorsi di Patti et 
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al, 2004). Building upon several other studies on competition in the banking industry, bank market pow-
er is measured by using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index on deposits. Two models are then estimated: 
one for firm birth, the other for firm activity. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a review of the major literature 
on the economic effects of bank competition, as well as a brief overview of the issues related to the fi-
nancing of cooperative firms; Section 3 illustrates the econometric specifications and methodology 
adopted; Section 4 describes the data; Section 5 comments on the results obtained and the robustness 
checks performed; finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
 
2. BANKING MARKET STRUCTURE AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In recent years newly created firms received considerable attention in the economic literature, espe-
cially as regards small and medium sized ones. It has indeed been argued that since a significant propor-
tion of employment is created by new firms, which often bring productive innovation, it is essential to 
understand the factors promoting or mitigating entrepreneurial activity (Lee et al, 2004). 
A first line of research focuses on the personal characteristics of entrepreneurs (e.g. Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1990; Chell et al, 1991), whereas a second line of study explains firm start-up and activity fo-
cusing on environmental and institutional characteristics. In this latter strand of analysis capital availa-
bility has been considered an important issue. In fact, since entrepreneurship may be limited by liquidity 
constraints (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989), the financial resources that potential entrepreneurs have to 
finance their business are expected to influence firm creation and activity. However, while numerous 
studies have shown that entrepreneurship is bounded by liquidity constraints (e.g. Storey, 1982; Garofo-
li, 1994; Keeble and Walker, 1994, Fotopoulos and Spence, 1999; Guiso et al, 2004a), fewer works in-
vestigated how, by influencing credit availability, the structure of the financial sector affects entrepre-
neurial activity (Black et al, 2002). This issue forms part of the wider debate on the economic effects of 
bank competition that has lately attracted the attention of many scholars. The conclusions so far reached 
in this dispute are not univocal, on both theoretical and empirical grounds. 
The conventional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) scheme argues that restraining competition 
in the banking industry produces welfare losses, since banks enjoying market power can lower the 
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amount of credit granted and charge higher interest rates on loans (e.g. Pagano, 1993; Guzman, 2000; 
Cetorelli, 2001). Among the studies providing empirical support to this approach, Black et al. (2002) 
show that the late 1970s U.S. branching and interstate banking reform, which fostered competition in the 
credit sector by removing restrictions on branching, has been beneficial to entrepreneurship. Indeed, the 
rate of new incorporations in local markets increased significantly when states opened to external com-
petition. In line with this conclusion also Strahan (2002) and Cetorelli (2004) document a positive link 
between bank competition and entrepreneurship.  
The Black and Strahan (2002) model has been questioned by Wall (2004) who shows that, when the 
effects of U.S. deregulation are allowed to differ across regions, entrepreneurship is inversely related to 
increased banking competition in some regions, and positively associated in others. Recent studies pro-
posed within the information-based-approach raise doubts on the beneficial impact of bank competition 
on the economy. Broadly speaking, these contributions emphasize the role of asymmetric information 
problems in lending relationships and show that, by favoring the set in of lending relationships, market 
power in banking allows firms to obtain better financing terms. 
Within the information-based-approach, Petersen and Rajan (1995) prove that younger firms may re-
ceive more credit, and at better rates, in markets where banks hold a relatively high market power. The 
reason for this is that, although unknown young firms should face higher cost of credit and receive lower 
amount of loans – as a result of being riskier borrowers – banks enjoying market power may adopt the 
following lending strategy to young businesses: they may initially charge lower loan interest rates in or-
der to establish a lending relationship, and then extract rent (by charging higher interest rates) from 
eventually successful firms. Basically, in adopting such a strategy banks count on maintaining lending 
relationships in the future. However, this is less likely to occur where firms can be driven out by com-
petitors, so that in more competitive credit markets banks have less incentives to bear the initial cost of 
lending at lower rates to riskier borrowers, with the result that the latter could actually receive less credit 
and at higher rates. Nonetheless, Boot and Thakor (2000, p. 708) argue that “(i) there is more transaction 
lending at lower levels of interbank competition than at higher levels; (ii) increased interbank competi-
tion will increase relationship lending, but each loan will have less added value for borrowers”. 
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In support to the information-based-approach, Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004) find that 
bank market power is beneficial to firm birth only up to a certain point, after which it exerts a negative 
impact. Zarutskie (2006) traces the firm-level effects of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branch-
ing Efficiency Act of 1994, a major U.S. banking market deregulation which increased competition in 
credit markets. The author finds that, by increasing financial constraints, the deregulation had an adverse 
effect on the entrepreneurial activity of newly formed businesses. Shaffer (1998) shows that funds’ al-
locative efficiency is negatively influenced by increased banking competition. This is because the prob-
ability that low-quality applicants receive credit is higher as the number of banks in the market increas-
es, when banks’ screening models are imperfect and banks cannot distinguish new borrowers from those 
who have already been turned down by other banks. In line with this result is the work by Cao and Shi 
(2001), claiming that credit quantities are smaller and loan rates higher in markets where there are many 
competing banks, as competition would reduce the number of banks performing screening and compet-
ing in credit supply. Moreover, Marquez (2002) proves that borrower-specific information becomes 
more disperse in more competitive credit markets – since each bank has information on a smaller pool of 
borrowers – leading to less efficient screening and higher interest rates. 
Yet, beside the abovementioned studies, other works reach different conclusions. Indeed, Chen 
(2007) finds that increased banking competition improved loans quality in EU-15 countries, after the 
Second European Banking Directive has been introduced. Bertrand et al. (2007) document that, in the 
French case, following the deregulation process started in 1985 - which promoted, among other things, a 
more vigorous banking competition - banks improved their monitoring and/or screening functions and 
this had a positive effect on entrepreneurship. Moreover, Benfratello et al. (2006) argue that higher 
competition can lead banks to introduce better practices in screening, selecting, evaluating and monitor-
ing firms since, as Chen (2005) claims, when banks face competitive pressures, they are more likely to 
choose screening activity instead of collateral requirements. 
In between the two lines of research above discussed, other studies claim that market power in bank-
ing may have both positive and negative effects on the economy, making it difficult to establish which 
one predominates (e.g. Cetorelli, 1997; Cetorelli and Peretto, 2000). This result is supported empirically 
by works as Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), finding that, depending on the degree of bank competition, 
7 
some firms benefit while others lose. Also, Cetorelli (2003) shows that increased banking competition 
influences industries’ life-cycle dynamics by promoting job creation and growth at the start-up phase and 
in the early stages of entry. Yet, banking competition accelerates the exit of more mature establishments. 
The studies surveyed indicate unsettlement in both the theoretical and empirical literature as to the 
impact of banking market structure on entrepreneurs’ access to credit, hence, on entrepreneurial activity. 
This calls for further research and the present paper aims to bring a new contribution on the topic by 
looking at the effects that differences in the structure of local credit markets can exert on the creation 
and activity of cooperative and non-cooperative firms. 
 
 
2.1 Cooperative firms’ financing and performance. Does the institutional context matter? 
 
Distinguishing firms according to their institutional form is a non-trivial issue, since the availability of 
external sources of financing, and especially bank credit, has been regarded a critical factor influencing 
the creation, functioning and survival of cooperatives (Ben-Ner, 1988a and b). Indeed, t is widely ac-
cepted by scholars that since internal financing is neither sustainable nor efficient, due to the bias toward 
short-term investment and/or underinvestment created by the horizon problem1 (Furubotn and Pejovich, 
1970), external financing is the main channel of resources acquisition for cooperatives (Mygind, 1990). 
Vanek (1975), for instance, points out that, to avoid the problem created by self-financing, a cooperative 
economy needs a banking system providing the required funds. However, it has been argued that the in-
stitutional characteristics of cooperative firms create a number of issues in the relationship with external 
financers. By leading to agency problems in credit markets, cooperatives’ vaguely defined property rights 
(Cook, 1995) imply that these firms are likely to face higher costs of capital and/or credit rationing (Vita-
liano, 1983; Drèze, 1993; Dow, 2003) and this limits their extension in market economies (Enberg, 1993). 
More in detail, a first problem arises from workers’ typically limited wealth, and consequent risk 
aversion and liquidity constraints, which – by bounding the personal collateral available for obtaining 
loans – create a problem in terms of guarantees offered to third parties financing the firm (Jossa and Cu-
                                                 
1 The horizon problem concerns the impossibility for partners to recoup the self-financed capital invested in the firm 
when their expected tenure in the firm is shorter than the time it takes for the stream of discounted net returns from the 
project to equal the initial cost of the investment. 
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omo, 1997). This can constrain the amount of debt that can be raised and increase the cost of borrowing 
(Ben-Ner, 1988a). According to Putterman (1993), workers’ limited wealth, and the high cost to them of 
not diversifying risk,2 explain why cooperative firms are relatively rare as an organizational form. 
A further issue that contributes to render the bank-firm link more complex for cooperatives than for 
other business structures is the so-called commitment problem of members. Schlicht and von Weizäcker 
(1977) argue that in its essence, the commitment problem – which in their view is the root of the financ-
ing problems faced by cooperatives – arises from the fact that cooperative members are more likely than 
the partners of a capitalist firm to leave the company if its profitability deteriorates. So that, they may 
lack effort to operate successfully if in risky situations substantial parts of the losses can be get rid off by 
bankruptcy. From the bank’s viewpoint, this implies that lending to a firm of yet unknown future profit-
ability may be riskier in the case of a cooperative firm, since decisions tend to be short-sighted. 
An additional impediment to the financing of cooperatives, hence to their creation and development, 
results from the increased establishment costs created by their relative rarity as an organizational form 
(Ben-Ner, 1988b). These higher costs arise from two main factors: firstly, the issues previously discussed 
imply that acquisition of information about coops on the part of financial intermediaries is costlier than 
information on capitalist firms; secondly, since financial expertise on cooperatives is relatively more 
scarce and expensive, potential lenders may restrict loans and/or require higher interest rates for funding 
firms with unknown track records (Jefferis and Mason, 1990). In other words, “capital may be more cost-
ly [or less available] for cooperatives than for other firms because, being an unfamiliar type of organiza-
tion, they may be perceived as riskier organizations than capitalist firms” (Ben-Ner, 1998a, p. 290).3  
Finally, cooperatives are not profit-oriented and, for financial intermediaries, this poses the problem 
of how to evaluate the performance of these firms. Conventional economic indicators of performance 
                                                 
2 Cooperative members cannot diversify the risk to their employment, human capital and financial capital which are bun-
dled in the same coop (Ben-Ner, 1988b). 
3 On the issue of cooperatives’ credit riskiness, Jefferis and Mason (1990) argue that it is important to distinguish be-
tween actual and perceived risk. Indeed, unfamiliarity with coops on the part of banks causes an information defi-
ciency, which results in a higher level of risk being perceived by the lender, hence in either a higher interest rate on 
loans or a restriction on funds. However, this does not necessarily mean that the actual risk is greater, since the crucial 
factor is the risk perceived on the basis of the available information. 
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and efficiency provide an incomplete basis for comparing cooperative and capitalist firms, since these 
enterprises tend to operate under, at least partially, different sets of objectives (Bartlett et al. 1992). It 
can be argued that the major discriminant between cooperative and capitalist firms lies in the role as-
cribed to capital. In the former capital is an instrument necessary to realize the ultimate aim of those 
who decide to join a cooperative, be this the satisfaction of a need, the procurement of a job, and so on. 
By contrast, in the latter capital is both instrument and ultimate aim. In other words, beside economic 
purposes, cooperatives also pursue social goals; therefore, the role of relational goods – often able to 
counterbalance free riding and promote economic performance – should not be neglected (Zamagni 
2005). However, how to account for them when assessing potential loans remains an issue. 
The difficulties that cooperators might face in obtaining and providing financial capital have been 
used as an argument against the viability of these firms (Blair et al, 2000). However, research on coop-
eratives suggests that their success is highly dependent on the type of financial and cultural regime that 
prevails in the local and national economy (Milenkovitch, 1971; Hovart, 1975; Thomas and Logan, 
1982; Thomas and Defourny, 1990; Gagliardi, 2009). There is, in fact, substantial evidence showing that 
limited access to finance and/or inappropriate financing mechanisms imply that cooperatives have less 
impact than they could have (Thomas and Defourny, 1990). Jefferis and Mason (1990) point out that 
one reason for the decline of the British cooperative sector is that the financial environment has been re-
strictive on coops’ ability to raise finance (see also Oakeshott, 1978; Logan and Gregory, 1981). An ex-
ception to this general attitude on the part of financial institutions occurred in the decade from 1976 to 
1986, when there was a substantially increased availability of finance from public sources, which con-
tributed to the massive expansion of the British cooperative sector between 1980 and 1986 (Estrin and 
Pérotin, 1987; Jefferis and Mason, 1990).4 
Several studies have shown that finance does not represent a particular problem for cooperatives 
when institutional conditions are such that banks develop experience in lending to the cooperative sec-
                                                 
4 Podivinsky and Stewart (2007) report that cooperative firms’ registrations increased by more than 13% over the 10-
year period 1976-1985. Moreover, looking at the general pattern of entry in the UK, a comparison of the first half of 
the period (1976-1980) with the second one (1981-1985) reveals a growth rate of more than 300% in VAT registra-
tions for cooperatives and of 11% for other firms. 
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tor, as this tends to favor the acquisition of information on cooperatives’ credit riskiness (Bonin et al, 
1993; Smith, 2001). Analyzing the historical concentration of cooperative and capitalist firms, Ben-Ner 
(1988b) concludes that cooperatives’ diffusion (in labour and skill intensive industries) has been posi-
tively affected by mainly two factors, which reduced their formation costs: easier credit availability on 
more competitive and less discriminatory capital markets, and access to capital through specialized 
banks supported by the State or cooperatives’ organisations. In the Basque region of Spain, for instance, 
where Mondragón cooperatives are based, the availability of a specialized source of finance, through the 
interventionist role of the Caja Laboral Popular bank, has been a major factor accounting for the success 
of these Spanish coops (Fairclough, 1987). Indeed, at an early stage in their history, the Caja bank was set 
up with the explicit purpose of providing external funds to cooperative firms (Thomas and Logan, 1982). 
 
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This work empirically assesses the relationship between bank market power and the creation and activ-
ity of Italian firms, with a special focus on cooperatives. The central hypothesis of the paper is that, cete-
ris paribus, local differences in the structure of the banking market influence differently the financing of 
cooperatives, as compared to other forms of business organizations (namely, partnerships and corpora-
tions – henceforth, non-cooperative firms), with regard to both firm creation and entrepreneurial activity. 
The reasoning set out in the previous section provides the justification for carrying out the analysis by 
distinguishing between cooperative and non-cooperative firms. On one hand, it is reasonable to argue 
that, other things held equal, at an informative level cooperatives represent the least transparent (or more 
opaque) category of firms, hence (potentially) the riskiest business type for financial intermediaries. On 
the other hand, the studies belonging to the information-based-approach show that, in general terms, the 
implications of banking market structure can be different from those predicted by the traditional struc-
ture-conduct-performance scheme, with the effects on firms’ financing, hence on entrepreneurship, be-
ing also related to the possibility of setting in and maintaining lending relationships. In light of these 
considerations, focusing on possible differences among business structures assumes relevance since co-
operative firms’ institutional characteristics may impact negatively on the establishment and/or mainten-
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ance of lending relationships. The empirical strategy employed to carry out the analysis is presented in 
the following sub-sections. 
 
 
3.1 Measuring firm birth and activity 
 
Firms’ annual birth rate in industry i, province p and year t is measured as the flow of newly regis-
tered firms in year t on the stock of firms registered at the end of year t-1: 
 
1−
=
ipt
ipt
ipt reg
newreg
birth , where i=1,…,27; p=1,…,103; t=1998,…,2003.       (1) 
 
As far as firms’ activity rate is concerned, this is given, for each province p and sector i, by the flow of 
active firms in year t divided by the stock of firms registered at the end of the same year: 
 
ipt
ipt
ipt reg
active
activity = , where i=1,…,27; p=1,…,103; t=1998,…,2003.                   (2) 
 
The activity rate is here interpreted as a rough measure of firms’ ‘good health’, since - as indicated by 
InfoCamere5 - the stock of firms registered at the end of each year includes, beside the active ones, also 
those inactive, suspended, in liquidation and bankrupted. Thus, the activity rate gives the proportion of 
firms which are at least not in a declared state of difficulty. 
The distribution of firms’ birth and activity rates is such that the former variable takes on the value of 
zero for a considerable range of observations in both samples (i.e. cooperative and non-cooperative 
firms), whereas the latter assumes zero values for a non-trivial proportion of data only in the case of co-
operatives. Given these features of the dependent variables, the Tobit technique represents the most suita-
ble econometric modeling choice, as it allows to deal with continuous variables having positive probabili-
ty mass point at zero. Yet, as argued by Wooldridge (2002), applying a Tobit model to a panel data struc-
ture entails some problems. Firstly, one of the main assumptions underlying the unobserved effects (both 
random and fixed) Tobit model is the strict exogeneity of regressors. However, as argued in Section 5, 
there is reason to suspect that the indicator of bank market power may be endogenous. Secondly, a fixed 
                                                 
5 InfoCamere is the source from which data on firms’ demographics have been obtained. This organization coordi-
nates, at national level, the network of provincial Chambers of Commerce. 
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effects Tobit model would bring about – as the main doctrine argues – a further shortcoming, since esti-
mating limited dependent variable models with fixed effects entails an incidental parameters problem, 
which leads to inconsistent estimation of β  with T  fixed and ∞→N  (Wooldridge 2002). 
To avoid the abovementioned drawbacks, estimations are carried out on firms’ average birth and ac-
tivity rates. These are computed – for each province – at industry level on the years 1999-2003, since 
some of the market level variables used are measured at the beginning of the period under analysis (see 
sub-section 3.3).6 Employing average values brings about two further advantages: it allows to smooth 
the effect of temporary shocks, and leaves the opportunity to include in the analysis both industry-
specific effects and the heterogeneity across markets. 
 
 
3.2 Measuring bank market power 
 
Bank market power is measured at provincial level by using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
on deposits.7 Since in Italy (as in most European countries) data at local banking office level are not 
publicly available, by following Carbò Valverde et al. (2003), and Agostino and Trivieri (2008), each 
variable x needed in the computation of the HHI indicator is drawn as: 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛∗=
it
ipt
itipt BR
BR
Dd ,                                                                 (3) 
 
where i=1,..., N; p=1,..., 103; t=1998,…, 2003; iptd  indicates deposits for each branch office of bank i 
in province p in year t; itD  is the balance sheet value of deposits for bank i in year t; iptBR  is the number 
of branch offices of bank i in province p in year t; finally, itBR  is the total number of branch offices of 
bank i in year t. Then, for each year considered in the analysis, the indicator of local banking concentra-
tion is computed as: 
( )2∑= ipp msHHI ,                                                         (4) 
                                                 
6 Using variables defined in a period preceding the one considered in the empirical investigation underlies the assumption 
that some provincial characteristics take time to display their impact on firm’s creation and activity. 
7 The HHI is computed on deposits (and not on loans) since depositors typically have less market power than borrowers. 
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where ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
p
ip
ip D
d
ms   is the market share on deposits for each branch office of bank i in province p, and 
∑= i ipp DD . 
In the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, the HHI index is viewed as an inverse measure of 
bank competition: higher values of HHI are associated with a higher concentration of the credit market, 
hence with lower competition. Conversely, lower values of HHI indicate a less concentrated banking in-
dustry, and thus more competition.8 
 
 
3.3 The econometric specifications 
 
As previously mentioned, the empirical analysis is implemented by applying the Tobit technique to 
estimate the models for the creation and activity of cooperatives, and also for the creation of non-
cooperative firms. Linear regressions are, instead, carried out when the average activity rate is the de-
pendent variable in the equation estimated for the sample of non-cooperative firms (see sub-section 3.1). 
In the econometric specification of the model concerning firm birth (BIRTH),9 the following explana-
tory variables are included: the 1999-2003 firms’ average cancellation rate (DEATH),10 which should be 
positively correlated to firm birth since, due to firms’ turnover, relatively more firms should be created 
where a larger proportion of existing firms disappear11; the initial industry share in each province 
(INDUSHARE), accounting for the fact that new firms are less likely to be formed in relatively densely 
                                                 
8 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is the measure used in most studies on banking market power, though it has been 
criticised by several authors (for a critical review see Guzman, 2000). Alternative indicators suggested by the litera-
ture are the Lerner Index and the non-structural H statistic of Panzar and Rosse (1987). However, data availability has 
precluded the use of such indicators in the empirical analysis of this paper. 
9 This variable is labeled BIRTH_OF for non-cooperative firms and BIRTH_COOP when referred to cooperatives. 
10 DEATH is obtained by averaging over the years 1999-2003 the annual cancellation rates, computed for sector i and 
province p as the ratio of firms cancelled in year t over the stock of firms registered at the end of year t-1. This vari-
able is labeled similarly to BIRTH, depending on which group of firms it refers to. 
11 The regressions having BIRTH_COOP as dependent variable include also the birth and death rates of other firms 
(BIRTH_OF and DEATH_OF). 
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populated markets12; the indicator of local banking concentration (HHI), described in sub-section 3.2; 
the (log of) average provincial population (POP), as a measure of local market size; the share of work-
force with a high school diploma or higher degree in 1997 (EDUC), proxying for human capital en-
dowment; a proxy for the strength of community ties (STIES) - or, as some authors claim, a proxy for 
civicness, hence for social capital13 - obtained by averaging data on electoral participation,14 so as to ac-
count for the possible impact of differences in social structure on firm birth; a proxy for adherence to 
corporate law, given by the crimes committed against the economy normalized by population and aver-
aged over the years 1999-2003 (CRIMEECO)15; a dummy variable (CEN-NORTH), taking on the value 
of 1 for Center Northern provinces and 0 otherwise; the share of municipalities having less than 30,000 
residents in 1996 (SMALLTOWN), accounting for the presence of external and agglomeration econo-
mies which should lead urban areas to have higher firm birth rates; a proxy for the level of local infra-
structures (ROADS), measured as kilometers of non-urban roads at the end of 1996 normalized by prov-
ince area, and expected to have a positive effect on economic activity, hence on entrepreneurship; the 
provincial real per capita income in 1998 (RPI) as a proxy for local wealth controlling for the fact that, if 
convergence effects are at work, economies with low initial incomes should grow faster (Barro, 1991; 
                                                 
12 INDUSHARE is calculated as the ratio of registered firms in industry i and province p in 1998 over the total number 
of firms registered in province p in the same year. 
13 Starting from Putnam’s (1993) seminal study, various indexes proxying for social capital have been used in the lit-
erature. It is, however, still debated which is the most appropriate indicator. The electoral participation to referenda 
and elections has been used by studies as Helliwell and Putnam (1995), Forni and Paba (2000), Guiso et al. (2004a, 
2004b) and Benfratello et al. (2006). 
14 The rounds of voting included in STIES are: the 1995 referenda, the 1999 European elections and the 2001 referenda. 
The choice of these rounds has been driven by data availability. Indeed, information on participation to the general 
elections is not available at provincial level, but only for constituencies. Moreover, regional elections do not always 
take place for all regions in the same year, so that data on voters turnout are not evenly available. 
15 The crimes this variable includes are: falsity in acts and persons; counterfeit, alteration or use of trademarks; other 
crimes against the safety, the economy and the public trust. Since information on this variable was accessible only for 
the years 2000-2003, the 2000 figures have been imputed to the year 1999, so as to compute the mean value over the 
period 1999-2003. 
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Mankiw et al, 1992), hence should display higher rates of firm creation; finally, to account for sectoral 
specific effects, industry dummies are included (INDUSTRY). 
Turning to the specification for the regressions on firms’ activity rate (ACTV),16 beside the variables 
so far described, it accounts also for firms’ average birth rates. Moreover, in the equation estimated for 
cooperatives, the average activity rate of other firms (ACTV_OF) is also employed.17 For a more de-
tailed description of the variables included in the empirical models and for their main summary statistics 
see tables 1 and 2, respectively.18 
 
[Insert tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
 
4. DATA 
 
The data used in this study come from several sources. Information on firms has been obtained from 
Movimprese, a database compiled by InfoCamere containing data on firms’ demographics collected 
from local firm registries. In particular, gross flows of newly created, active and cancelled firms are 
present in this dataset, as well as end of year stocks of registered firms. This piece of information is 
available for 103 provinces, 28 industrial sectors and firm legal structure (i.e. sole traders, partnerships, 
corporations, cooperatives, and other legal forms). The dataset for the period 1998-2003 is initially made 
up of 17,304 observations. From it, are dropped observations on firms operating in the financial sector, 
since the great part of financial firms are banks. This leads to 16,686 observations. Then, since the inten-
tion is to focus on enterprises, sole traders are excluded. The category labeled ‘other firms’ is also de-
leted because it groups a heterogeneous class, comprising a great number of typologies, in many cases 
representative of only a small number of firms. Finally, after taking the average values for the period 
                                                 
16 Also this variable is labeled differently depending on which group of firms is taken into account. It is identified as 
ACTV_COOP in the estimations for cooperatives and as ACTV_OF in those carried out on non-cooperative firms. 
17 Data availability precluded the possibility to explicitly account for other non-financial variables that may impact on 
firms’ activity. Nonetheless, both industry and market specific effects can be included in the empirical models to mitigate 
the concern for omitted variables (see sub-section 5.1). Yet, the intention for future research is to dispose of a more varied 
and richer dataset. 
18 The correlation matrix for the variables used in the estimations is reported in the Appendix. 
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1999-2003, and checking for the presence of outliers, the sample employed in the estimations is made 
up of 2,220 observations.19 
A second dataset employed is BILBANK, edited by the Italian Banking Association (ABI) and con-
taining balance sheet data on nearly all Italian banks for each year in the period 1998-2003. A third 
piece of information comes from the Bank of Italy and regards the provincial distribution of branches 
for each Italian bank over the period 1998-2003. This is used to disaggregate banking balance sheet data 
at provincial level, as illustrated in sub-section 3.2. A fourth data source is the Italian National Statistical 
Institute (ISTAT): figures on provincial income, population, voters’ turnout, and crimes against the 
economy are drawn from here. Finally, data on human capital, municipal distribution of population and 
infrastructural endowment are drawn from the Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004) database. 
Table 2 reports the main summary statistics for the sample employed in the estimations. As shown 
there, non-cooperative firms’ average birth rate is 2.17%. This rate is highest (25%) in fishery, and in the 
leather tanning and finishing industry, while its lowest (positive) value is in (other) public, social and per-
sonal services (0.09%). Passing to cooperatives, table 2 reports that their average birth rate is 2.06%. This 
is maximum (50%) in transports, storage and communications, and in the manufacture of mechanical ma-
chinery and equipment. Yet, fewest coops are formed in agriculture, hunting and forestry (0.06%). 
As far as firms’ average activity rate is concerned, this is 78.17% for non-cooperative firms (see table 
2), and it is maximum (100%) in the sectors of: fishery; mineral extraction; chemical production; manu-
facture of transport means; electricity, water and gas production and distribution, and education. In all 
the just mentioned sectors but fishery, also cooperative firms have the highest activity rate (100%) – on 
average equal to 66.02% (see table 2) – as well as in the remaining manufacturing industries, the hospi-
tality and restoration sector, the transports, storage and communications industry, and the health and so-
cial services sector. On the other hand, firms’ lowest (positive) activity rates are in chemicals production 
for non-cooperative firms (22.56%), and in constructions for cooperatives (7.54%). 
It is worth noting that the average cancellation rate is maximum in the fishery sector for non-
cooperative firms (15%), and for cooperatives in the non-energy minerals extractive industry, in some 
                                                 
19 Following Servèn (2003), the criterion used to operate the outliers correction is to consider as outliers the observa-
tions for which any of the variables lie beyond 10 standard deviation away from the mean. 
17 
manufacturing sectors, and in electricity, water and gas production and distribution (50%). Moreover, 
the minimum (positive) rate of cancellation is in the transports, storage and communication industry for 
non-cooperative firms (0.26%), and in the construction industry for cooperatives (0.63%). 
Regarding territorial differences in entrepreneurship, in the sample, the average birth rate of non-
cooperative firms is 2.44% in the Center-Northern area, and 1.69% in the Southern one. For cooperatives, 
instead, these figures are 2.45% and 1.40%, respectively. Also firms’ activity rate is higher in the Center-
North than in the South (79.89% versus 75.19% for non-cooperatives, and 67.63% versus 63.24% for co-
operatives). Finally, with respect to firms’ cancellation, this is higher in the Center-North than in the 
South, for both non-cooperative (2.98% versus 2.34%) and cooperative firms (3.61% versus 2.37%). 
 
 
 
5. RESULTS 
 
Estimation results are reported in tables 3-6. All estimations have been carried out using robust stan-
dard errors.20 After having run all regressions, the average value of the square of HHI (HHI2) has been 
included in the econometric specifications, in order to test for non-monotonic effects of local banking 
concentration on firm creation and activity. Results obtained from these latter estimations reveal statisti-
cally significant non-linear effects of bank market power for both samples. This suggests that the speci-
fications with non-linearity are the relevant ones. Yet, a major criticism that could be advanced to the 
analysis is that the indicator of local banking concentration may be endogenous, if banks tend to enter 
local markets where the rates of firm creation and activity are higher for exogenous reasons. To deal 
with this potential objection all regressions are re-estimated by testing for endogeneity. To do so, the 
                                                 
20 A way to compute robust standard errors for the Tobit model is to resort to interval regression. To do so, it is first 
necessary to reconfigure the data by assigning two values of the response variable to each observation. When the re-
sponse variable is left-censored, as in the case under exam, the first value is set to missing and the other to zero. Of 
course, the point estimates obtained with the interval regression are exactly the same as those of the Tobit regression. 
Therefore, to avoid cluttering, only the interval regression estimates are reported. 
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Wald test is carried out for the Tobit regressions and the Hausman test is run for the OLS regressions.21 
Regarding the instruments employed, these are the HHI indicator and DENSITY (provincial population 
over province area), both taken at their 1995 values, and MUN (number of provincial municipalities in 
logarithmic terms). 22  
The estimations carried out on the sample of cooperative firms do not reveal presence of endogeneity 
of HHI and HHI2 for both BIRTH_COOP and ACTV_COOP (see table 3). Therefore, the results pre-
viously obtained, and reported in table 3, are the relevant ones for these models. Focusing on the varia-
ble of interest, that is the measure of bank market power, column BIRTH_COOP in table 3 shows that 
HHI follows a bell-shaped pattern; this suggests that a relatively concentrated local credit market is 
beneficial to the creation of cooperative firms, while it has a detrimental impact after it reaches a thre-
shold. Looking at the results on the quadratic functional form of HHI in the estimates for the model on 
firm’s activity (column ACTV_COOP in table 3), the evidence shows a U-shaped relationship between 
bank market power and cooperatives’ activity rate. This indicates that active cooperatives benefit from 
more intense banking competition, even though this latter has negative effects when too exasperated. 
 
[Insert table 3 here] 
 
Turning to the results obtained for the sample of non-cooperative firms, presented in table 4, the Wald 
test reported in column BIRTH_OF fails to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the concentration 
indicator in the model for birth. Figures in the same table show that, as for BIRTH_COOP, also in the 
case of BIRTH_OF the relationship between non-cooperative firms’ creation and bank market power 
presents a bell-shaped pattern. As regards the model for firm activity, the Hausman test reveals evidence 
of endogeneity of HHI and HHI2 (table 4, column ACTV_OF). As opposed to the evidence obtained for 
                                                 
21 The Wald test of exogeneity is a test of joint correlation between the error terms in the structural equation and those 
in the reduced-form equations for the endogenous variables. In the two-step estimator, the residuals from the first 
stage are included as regressors in the second stage. The Wald statistics is a test of significance of those residuals. 
22 Results for the Hansen-Sargan test are reported only for the OLS regressions. This is because econometric software do 
not allow to carry out such a test for the Tobit model. However, in order to have at least a feeling about the validity of the 
instruments used, the Tobit specifications have been estimated by OLS, so as to obtain the Hansen-Sargan statistic. The 
outcomes of the Hansen-Sargan test never rejected the null that the instruments were valid. 
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the sample of cooperatives, the non-linear pattern followed by these variables is once again bell-shaped, 
showing that for the activity of non-cooperative firms some market power in the local credit market is 
beneficial, while it has negative effects after it goes beyond a threshold. 
 
[Insert table 4 here] 
 
To sum up the empirical evidence obtained, the results for the model of firm creation show a bell-
shaped relationship between bank market power and firm birth, for both cooperative and non-cooperative 
firms. This finding can be interpreted arguing that, at the time of their establishment, it is likely that firms 
are considered to be equally risky by banking institutions, independently of their legal structure.23 In other 
words, this seems to suggest that, when firms start-up, cooperatives’ institutional characteristics would 
not represent for banks an element for discriminating between these firms and other business structures. 
Passing to firms’ activity rate, the results show that a relatively higher concentration of the credit 
market tends to favor non-cooperative firms, while this would be detrimental for cooperatives – which 
seem to benefit from a more intense banking competition.24 This conclusion appears to be coherent with 
the hypothesis put forward in the paper, according to which the effects produced by structure of the cre-
dit market can differ between coops and non-coops, due to the fact that cooperatives’ institutional speci-
ficities can jeopardize the maintenance of lending relationships; so that, where the credit market is more 
concentrated, these firms would be disadvantaged. 
On the other hand, the evidence according to which a greater banking competition would be benefi-
cial for cooperatives could be explained by resorting to at least two arguments: firstly, a higher number 
of banks operating in the market could lead (the most) opaque firms to fractionalize their debt among 
several intermediaries, so as to maximize the amount of credit obtained. On their part, in such a situa-
tion, banks are more inclined to lend to opaque firms counting on the monitoring activity of the other 
intermediaries involved. This interpretation could be consistent with the multi-banks relationships phe-
                                                 
23 It is worth noting that in the sample of non-cooperative firms more than 90% observations lie below the 
threshold value of HHI, while this figure is nearly 80% for cooperatives. 
24 For both cooperative and non-cooperative firms, almost 90% observations fall before the parabolas minimum 
and maximum points, respectively. 
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nomenon (known as multiaffidamento) characterizing the Italian business practice (see for instance, Pa-
gano et al, 1998, and Ongena and Smith, 2000). An alternative interpretation could be that increased 
competitive pressures encourage more efficient bank screening procedures, so that banks are inclined to 
lend to (more) opaque firms on the basis of expected performance rather than past records. Indeed, as 
claimed by Benfratello et al. (2006, p. 9-10), as a consequence of higher competition, banks may “intro-
duce better and more advanced practices in the screening, selection, evaluation and monitoring of 
projects and entrepreneurs. […] These practices could include looking more carefully and with better 
tools at borrowers’ future prospects, as opposed to relying purely on firms’ marketable assets as colla-
teral, which characterizes standard operating behavior in many cases”. 
The findings can be interpreted by means of the institutional complementarity approach à la Aoki 
(2001): the relationships between firms and banking institutions can be considered complementary in the 
sense that the presence of firms (i.e. their birth rate) and their effectiveness (evaluated in terms of their 
activity rate) are reinforced by the institutionalized presence of specific arrangements characterizing the 
governance mechanisms operating in the financial domain. More precisely, a relatively more concen-
trated banking system seems to be complementary to both the creation and activity of non-cooperative 
firms. On the other hand, while banks enjoying some market power appear to favor also the creation of 
cooperatives, it is a relatively more competitive banking system the institutional counterpart that streng-
thens cooperatives in their activity.  
 
 
5.1 Robustness 
 
To test the robustness of the results, several sensitivity checks are performed. Firstly, to account for 
market specific effects, the models are re-estimated by including market dummy variables. This specifi-
cation is robust to the existence of market specific omitted variables; moreover, it reduces the concern 
for the endogeneity of the bank market power index. Results obtained from these estimations, presented 
in table 5, fully confirm the conclusions previously drawn. 
 
[Insert table 5 here] 
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As a further check, an alternative indicator of banking market structure is employed (∆HHI). This is 
given by the absolute value of the change of HHI between the beginning and end of the period examined 
(Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004). This is an inverse measure of bank market power, under the 
assumption that significant changes in industry structure affect banks’ expectations of extracting future 
rents from borrowers. To make ∆HHI positively correlated with market power, its linear transformation is 
taken (1-∆HHI). Then, all regressions are re-run by including 1-∆HHI and its squared (1-∆HHI2). The re-
sults (not reported, but available from the author upon request) are basically unchanged. 
Conclusions continue to hold also when sole traders are included in the sample of non-cooperative 
firms, and when the proxy used to measure the strength of community ties (STIES) is replaced with 
NOTIES – an inverse measure of social ties, given by the number of suicides normalized by population. 
Table 6 reports the marginal effects and threshold values of HHI for the estimates in tables 3, 4 and 5. 
 
[Insert table 6 here] 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper investigated the relationship between banking market structure and the creation and activi-
ty of firms. In order to test for differences among different business structures, the empirical analysis 
confronted cooperative and non-cooperative firms. The econometric investigation, carried out on a sam-
ple of Italian firms operating in 27 industries during the period 1998-2003, leads to some major conclu-
sions. The first one is that the impact of bank market power on the creation of cooperatives does not 
seem to be different from that exerted on non-cooperative firms operating in the same local market. For 
all business types, the empirical analysis finds a bell-shaped relationship between bank market power 
and firms’ birth rate, suggesting that firm creation is favored by a moderate bank market power, which is 
instead detrimental after it reaches a threshold. This finding – in line with the conclusions reached, for 
instance, by Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Zarutskie (2006) – can be interpreted arguing that, at the 
time of their establishment, firms tend to be considered equally risky by banking institutions. In other 
words, when firms start-up, cooperatives’ institutional characteristics would not represent for banks an 
element for discriminating between these firms and other business types. 
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A less homogeneous pattern, and this is a second main conclusion, is found with respect to firms’ ac-
tivity rate. In this regard, the empirical evidence still finds a bell-shaped parabola for non-cooperative 
firms. By contrast, a U-shaped relationship emerges for cooperatives: this seems to indicate that active 
cooperatives in the market benefit from more intense banking competition, even though it produces neg-
ative effects when too exasperated. This result lends support to the hypothesis put forward in the paper, 
according to which that the effects produced by the structure of the banking market can differ between 
coops and non-coops, since cooperatives’ institutional specificities can jeopardize the possibility of 
maintaining lending relationships; so that, where the credit market is more concentrated, these firms 
would be disadvantaged. On the other hand, the evidence according to which a greater banking competi-
tion would be beneficial for cooperatives can be explained by resorting to at least two arguments: firstly, 
a higher number of banks operating in the market could lead (the most) opaque firms to fractionalize 
their debt among several intermediaries, in order to maximize the amount of credit obtained. On their 
part, in such a situation, banks are more inclined to lend to opaque firms counting on the monitoring ac-
tivity of the other intermediaries involved (Pagano et al, 1998; Ongena and Smith, 2000). An alternative 
interpretation could be that increased competitive pressures encourage more efficient bank screening pro-
cedures, so that banks are inclined to lend to (more) opaque firms on the basis of expected performance 
rather than past records and firms’ marketable assets as collateral (Benfratello et al. 2006). 
In terms of the institutional complementarity approach, the findings suggest that, for the Italian case, a 
relatively more concentrated banking system is complementary to both the birth and activity of non-
cooperative firms. Moreover, while banks enjoying some market power tend to favor also the creation of 
cooperatives, it is a relatively more competitive banking system the institutional counterpart that streng-
thens their activity. Overall considered, the results for cooperatives are in line with the studies showing 
that the performance of these firms strongly depends on the institutional context in which they operate 
(e.g. Hovart, 1975; Gagliardi, 2009). A major implication of the evidence obtained is that, with regard to 
the creation phase of their life-cycle, cooperatives are not different from other firms – at least for how 
they tend to be perceived by banking institutions and respond to bank market power. It is, however, dur-
ing their activity that cooperatives appear to manifest a behavior different from other enterprises and, in 
this respect, further research is called for to inquire into the sources and consequences of this diversity. 
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BIRTH_OF Average birth rate of partnerships and corporations for the years 1999-2003
BIRTH_COOP Average birth rate of cooperative firms for the years 1999-2003
ACTV_OF Average activity rate of partnerships and corporations for the years 1999-2003
ACTV_COOP Average activity rate of cooperative firms for the years 1999-2003 
DEATH_OF Average death rate of partnerships and corporations for the years 1999-2003 
DEATH_COOP Average death rate of cooperative firms for the years 1999-2003 
INDUSHARE Registered firms in industry i and province p on total registered firms in the province in 1998
HHI Average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  on deposits at provincial level for the period 1999-2003 (*100)  
HHI2 Squared of the average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index on deposits  
POP Average provincial population for the period 1999-2003
EDUC Share of workforce with a high school diploma or higher degree in 1997
STIES Average electoral participation to the 1995 and 2001 referenda, and to the 1999 European elections
CRIMEECO Number of crimes committed against the economy normalized by population (average 1999-2003) *1000  
CEN-NORTH Dummy = 1 if firm is located in the Center Northern area and zero otherwise
SOUTH Dummy = 1 if firm is located in the South and zero otherwise
SMALLTOWN Share of municipalities with less than 30,000 residents in 1996
ROADS Kilometers of non-urban roads at the end of 1996 normalized by province area (Km2) 
RPI Real per capita income in 1998
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
BIRTH_OF * 2220 2.1657 2.2184 0 25.0
BIRTH_COOP * 2220 2.0617 4.7024 0 50.0
ACTV_OF * 2220 78.165 12.106 0 100
ACTV_COOP * 2220 66.021 25.991 0 100
DEATH_OF * 2220 2.7468 1.4213 0 15.0
DEATH_COOP * 2220 3.1506 5.3288 0 50.0
INDUSHARE * 2220 4.4060 7.8410 0.0020 48.8177
HHI 2220 13.177 5.525 5.15 42.45
POP + 2220 591,913 645,737 90,065 3,721,603
EDUC * 2220 37.207 4.099 22.406 49.460
STIES * 2220 54.045 8.090 36.767 68.906
CRIMEECO 2220 3.5993 1.3861 1.1218 11.7971
CEN-NORTH 2220 0.6329 0.4821 0 1
SOUTH 2220 0.3671 0.4821 0 1
SMALLTOWN * 2220 48.519 25.650 0 93.330
ROADS * 2220 17.986 3.545 7.800 26.300
RPI # 2220 16.684 4.279 8.965 27.728
TABLE 2 - Summary statistics
For the description of the variables see table 1. * In percentage terms; # in thousands of Euro; + in units. All the
other variables are dummies, with the exception of HHI and CRIMEECO (see table 1).
TABLE 1 - Description of variables
Description
All variables are drawn from InfoCamere except for: i) HHI and HHI2, obtained by calculations on data BILBANK (ABI) and Bank of Italy; ii) RPI,
POP, STIES and CRIMEECO, drawn from ISTAT; iii) EDUC, SMALLTOWN and ROADS, drawn from Bonaccorsi di Patti et al . (2004).  
BIRTH_OF 1.0973 0.0000
DEATH_OF 0.1659 0.3690
BIRTH_COOP 0.1205 0.3480
DEATH_COOP -0.0752 0.1490 -0.6513 0.0000
ACTV_OF 0.6633 0.0000
INDUSHARE 0.0669 0.0210 -0.1504 0.0680
HHI 0.2732 0.0550 -0.7503 0.0300
HHI2 -0.9006 0.0100 2.1432 0.0060
POP 1.3266 0.0000 -1.0433 0.2600
EDUC 0.0847 0.1500 -0.0835 0.6230
STIES 0.0254 0.6090 -0.4088 0.0060
CRIMEECO -0.1322 0.3920 -0.1131 0.8160
CEN-NORTH 0.5630 0.5870 2.9590 0.3130
ROADS 0.0971 0.2660 -0.0807 0.6710
SMALLTOWN -0.0028 0.7600 0.0028 0.9130
RPI 0.0156 0.8720 0.5715 0.0420
Wald test 531.56 0.0000 862.56 0.0000
Wald test of exogeneity 2.64 0.2676 3.61 0.1647
N.OBS 2,220 2,220
left-censored 1,204 110
uncensored 1,016 2,110
BIRTH_OF -1.1410 0.0270
DEATH_OF 0.1609 0.0030 -1.2872 0.1430
INDUSHARE 0.0176 0.3180 0.0343 0.9080
HHI 0.9416 0.0630 24.907 0.0040
HHI2 -2.3917 0.0800 -66.551 0.0040
POP 0.0010 0.9950 2.9724 0.2660
EDUC -0.0873 0.0180 -2.5048 0.0000
STIES -0.0230 0.1550 -0.1436 0.5970
CRIMEECO 0.0198 0.7940 2.6991 0.0330
CEN-NORTH -0.6031 0.3860 -26.406 0.0240
ROADS -0.0867 0.2400 -3.3365 0.0080
SMALLTOWN -0.0070 0.1030 0.1429 0.0420
RPI 0.1866 0.0030 2.5733 0.0180
Wald test 831.58 0.0000
Wald test of exogeneity 11.81 0.0027
F-test 1.81 0.0017
Uncentered R-Squared 0.703
Sargan Statistic 0.019 0.8903
Wu-Hausman test 86.09 0.0000
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 162.64 0.0000
N.OBS 2,220 2,220
left-censored 222
uncensored 1,998
TABLE 3 - Cooperative firms' birth and activity rates results
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
BIRTH_COOP ACTV_COOP
For the description of the variables see table 1. The regressions are estimated employing market-industry
observations. In italics are reported the p-values of the tests. The z and t statistics (not reported) are based
on robust standard errors. In both tables, industry dummies and constant included but not reported. Interval
regression is a Tobit estimation with robust SE. The instrumental variables used in the regressions testing
for endogeneity are: the 1995 value of HHI; DENSITY (provincial population over province area), and MUN
(number of municipalities at provincial level in logarithm terms).   
BIRTH_OF ACTV_OF
Two-step Tobit 2SLS
Interval regression Interval regression
TABLE 4 - Non-Cooperative firms' birth and activity rates results
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
BIRTH_OF 0.2496 0.0410 -0.1964 0.2780
DEATH_OF -0.0299 0.8690 0.0722 0.2850 0.3167 0.3180
BIRTH_COOP -0.0067 0.9600
DEATH_COOP -0.0769 0.1550 -0.6888 0.0000
ACTV_OF 0.1976 0.0640
INDUSHARE 0.0668 0.0390 0.0116 0.3240 -0.1377 0.0620 -0.0138 0.7010
HHI 0.6712 0.0360 0.1222 0.0300 -2.2365 0.0020 1.1159 0.0000
HHI2 -1.4592 0.0370 -0.2320 0.0570 4.8961 0.0010 -2.0514 0.0000
POP 1.5763 0.0310 -0.0840 0.4860 -6.8612 0.0020 -2.5538 0.0000
EDUC 0.1352 0.4430 -0.0776 0.0170 0.4408 0.2580 -0.8592 0.0000
STIES 0.0033 0.9710 0.0471 0.0140 -0.6469 0.0480 -0.2816 0.0010
CRIMEECO -0.2230 0.5330 -0.1187 0.1310 -2.8514 0.0010 -1.1950 0.0000
ROADS -0.0048 0.9840 0.0492 0.3930 0.0902 0.8520 0.4496 0.0210
SMALLTOWN 0.0221 0.2670 -0.0010 0.7790 0.0546 0.4010 -0.0083 0.7030
RPI 0.4928 0.0160 0.0115 0.7790 2.0229 0.0000 0.4987 0.0030
F-test 51.37 0.0000
R-Squared 0.6774
Wald test 716.91 0.0000 3117.37 0.0000 1914.68 0.0000
N.OBS 2,220 2,220 2,220 2,220
left-censored 1,204 222 110
uncensored 1,016 1,998 2,110
TABLE 5 - Robustness: including market fixed effects
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
BIRTH_COOP BIRTH_OF ACTV_COOP ACTV_OF
For the description of the variables see table 1. The regressions are estimated employing market-industry
observations. In italics are reported the p-values of the tests. The z and t statistics (not reported) are based on
robust standard errors. Industry dummies, market dummies and constant included but not reported. 
Interval regression Interval regression Interval regression Linear regression
BIRTH_COOP BIRTH_OF ACTV_COOP ACTV_OF
BIRTH_OF 0.3195 -1.1410
DEATH_OF 0.0483 0.1290 -1.2872
BIRTH_COOP 0.0871
DEATH_COOP -0.0219 -0.4707
ACTV_OF 0.4795
INDUSHARE 0.0195 0.0094 -0.1087 0.0343
HHI 0.0796 0.0386 -0.5424 24.907
HHI2 -0.2623 -0.0830 1.5491 -66.551
POP 0.3863 -0.1882 -0.7541 2.9724
EDUC 0.0247 -0.0158 -0.0604 -2.5048
STIES 0.0074 -0.0072 -0.2955 -0.1436
CRIMEECO -0.0385 -0.0370 -0.0818 2.6991
CEN-NORTH 0.1629 0.1760 2.1483 -26.406
ROADS 0.0283 0.0024 -0.0584 -3.3365
SMALLTOWN -0.0008 -0.0067 0.0020 0.1429
RPI 0.0045 0.0556 0.4131 2.5733
Threshold value of HHI 0.1517 0.2327 0.1750 0.1871
BIRTH_COOP BIRTH_OF ACTV_COOP ACTV_OF
BIRTH_OF 0.0720 -0.1964
DEATH_OF -0.0086 0.0504 0.3167
BIRTH_COOP -0.0051
DEATH_COOP -0.0222 -0.5202
ACTV_OF 0.1493
INDUSHARE 0.0193 0.0081 -0.1040 -0.0138
HHI 0.1937 0.0854 -1.6892 1.1159
HHI2 -0.4210 -0.1620 3.6979 -2.0514
POP 0.4548 -0.0587 -5.1821 -2.5538
EDUC 0.0390 -0.0542 0.3329 -0.8592
STIES 0.0009 0.0329 -0.4886 -0.2816
CRIMEECO -0.0643 -0.0829 -2.1536 -1.1950
ROADS -0.0014 0.0343 0.0682 0.4496
SMALLTOWN 0.0064 -0.0007 0.0413 -0.0083
RPI 0.1422 0.0080 1.5278 0.4987
Threshold value of HHI 0.2300 0.2635 0.2284 0.2720
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
For the description of the variables see table 1. In the models for BIRTH_OF, BIRTH_COOP and
ACTV_COOP the interpretation of the marginal effects is in terms of the impact of a change in the
independent variables on the expected value of BIRTH and ACTV, conditional on being uncensored.
The standard interpretation applies to the model for ACTV_OF. In all models dy/dx is for discrete
change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
TABLE 6 - Marginal effects and threshold values for firms' birth and activity rates
A - Industry fixed effects
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
B - Industry and market fixed effects
APPENDIX - Correlation matrix
BIRTH_OF BIRTH_COOP DEATH_OF DEATH_COOP ACTV_OF ACTV_COOP INDUSHARE HHI HHI2 POP EDUC STIES CRIMEECO CEN_NORTH SMALLTOWN RAODS RPI
BIRTH_OF 1
BIRTH_COOP 0.2823 1
DEATH_OF 0.1643 0.0469 1
DEATH_COOP 0.0787 -0.0046 0.0556 1
ACTV_OF 0.0775 -0.0076 0.0289 0.0156 1
ACTV_COOP 0.0557 0.0391 0.0372 -0.1330 0.3503 1
INDUSHARE 0.1322 -0.0495 0.0370 0.0271 0.1220 -0.0152 1
HHI -0.0142 -0.0395 -0.1225 -0.1066 0.1073 0.0786 0.0108 1
HHI2 -0.0234 -0.0514 -0.1309 -0.0954 0.1047 0.0910 0.0088 0.9586 1
POP -0.0810 -0.0206 0.0179 -0.0213 -0.2812 -0.1037 -0.0345 -0.2761 -0.2061 1
EDUC -0.0584 0.0483 0.0199 -0.0192 -0.2934 -0.1204 -0.0055 0.0118 -0.0679 0.1080 1
STIES 0.1613 0.0889 0.2381 0.1268 0.2095 0.0551 0.0224 -0.1864 -0.1721 -0.0310 -0.0911 1
CRIMEECO -0.0756 -0.0233 0.0137 -0.0323 -0.1263 -0.0342 -0.0034 0.0873 0.0567 0.0839 0.3863 -0.2476 1
CEN_NORTH 0.1632 0.1069 0.2163 0.1120 0.1873 0.0815 0.0246 -0.1568 -0.1557 -0.0130 0.0407 0.6446 -0.0921 1
SMALLTOWN -0.0331 -0.0233 -0.0305 0.0255 0.1472 0.0857 0.0239 0.2638 0.2435 -0.3220 -0.0642 0.0422 0.1956 0.1824 1
RAODS -0.0924 -0.0085 0.0499 0.0191 -0.1919 -0.1008 -0.0051 -0.1284 -0.1829 0.0030 0.3944 -0.4027 0.4255 -0.3999 0.0164 1
RPI 0.1747 0.0931 0.2249 0.1342 0.1741 0.0825 0.0188 -0.2290 -0.1850 0.1753 -0.1489 0.6313 -0.1513 0.6628 0.1145 -0.413 1
For the description of the variables see table 1.
